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CHAPTER 15
Nearly 25 years after the 1994 genocide of Tutsis, Rwanda still struggles with the long‐term 
consequences of mass death and destruction. Between April 6 and July 4, 1994, an estimated 
800,000 Rwandans lost their lives in a state‐sponsored genocide that targeted ethnic Tutsis 
(United Nations Security Council 1999).1 Accountability for the innumerable individual 
and collective acts that constituted the genocide has been sought through an ad hoc inter-
national tribunal, foreign courts, Rwandan courts, and a transitional justice mechanism 
known as the Gacaca tribunals. This accountability for death sought to mete out justice to 
the hundreds of thousands of accused perpetrators and planners who had engaged in 
criminal acts ranging from theft to rape and mass murder.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), created by the UN Security 
Council on November 8, 1994, was set up with the intention of prosecuting the genocide’s 
architects, who had fled the country. Rwandan views of the ICTR were not always positive. 
Rwandans, including government spokespeople, criticized the ICTR because those pros-
ecuted by it faced lesser penalties than those tried inside Rwanda and enjoyed comparatively 
“luxurious” prison conditions. They condemned the vast resources consumed by the 
ICTR, which could have been used to rehabilitate Rwanda’s legal system and police force. 
The ICTR moved slowly and prosecuted only 28 defendants during the first 10 years of its 
operation.2
In Rwanda the new government, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel 
group that stopped the genocide when it seized power, attempted to hold accountable 
every single perpetrator from national leaders down to lowly, subsistence farmers (Waldorf 
2006: 3). In 1995 the first genocide trials began in courts that had originally been modeled 
on Belgian courts in the postindependence period. These early cases resulted in the first and 
Accountability 
for Mass Death, Acts 
of Rescue, and Silence 
in Rwanda
Jennie E. Burnet
206  jennie e. burnet
only public executions of convicted genocide perpetrators in April 1997. The approach of 
maximal prosecutions constituted a radical departure from precedents in other postconflict 
countries and overwhelmed the justice system. The government eventually turned to a 
novel solution by reinventing a conflict resolution mechanism, known as gacaca, that had 
been used since the precolonial period to resolve community conflicts.3 Beginning with a 
pilot phase in 2001, a nationwide rollout in 2005, and numerous revisions and adjustments 
to the law and procedures, the Gacaca tribunals tried over 1.9 million cases and found guilty 
verdicts in over 1.6 million cases (Gacaca Community Justice 2017). Upon the courts’ 
closure and the repeal of the laws creating them in 2012, thousands of unclosed cases were 
transferred to the country’s ordinary courts.
Outside Rwanda, foreign governments prosecuted Rwandans for genocide crimes under 
universal jurisdiction. In 2001 Belgium prosecuted two Roman Catholic nuns for genocide 
crimes and found them guilty along with two men (BBC News 2001). In the United States 
of America, whose legal statutes do not allow for such prosecutions, the government 
prosecuted genocide perpetrators for immigration fraud. In 2012 Prudence Katengwa was 
convicted of immigration fraud, perjury, and obstruction of justice in Boston for lying to 
enter the United States and seek asylum status (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
2012). In 2013 Beatrice Munyenyezi was sentence to 10 years in prison for lying to US 
government officials while seeking citizenship (Tuohy 2013).
These legal attempts to prosecute and punish genocide perpetrators constitute a kind 
of accountability for death. Yet, they are necessarily partial because they can only pass 
judgment on criminal acts. They do not encompass the moral culpability of those who 
failed to defend Tutsis against their attackers (often called “bystanders” in genocide 
studies); of the UN peacekeepers who abandoned Rwandans seeking shelter at UN 
compounds; or of the UN secretary‐general who refused to expand the peacekeepers’ 
mandate so that they could use force to protect civilians. From a humanistic perspective, 
this legal accountability does not encompass an accountability for life. Should we not 
investigate the opportunities, motivations, and actions of those who attempted to protect 
or to save lives during the genocide?
In this chapter I attempt to account for the acts of rescue and the moments of good that 
occurred in the midst of mass death and evil of genocide. In addition, I try to understand 
the factors that distinguish between rescuer behavior and rescuers. I use the term “rescuer 
behavior” to describe actions taken to protect, evacuate, or otherwise assist Tutsis. I apply 
this terms regardless of whether the people providing assistance may also have participated 
in the genocide. Rescuer behavior was very common in the Rwandan genocide even though 
genocide architects intentionally sought widespread popular participation. Many people 
resisted participating in the genocide for weeks or even months by refusing to take part in 
security patrols or by staying home, feigning sickness, to avoid participating in mob vio-
lence. I refer to this behavior as “genocide resistance” and to the people enacting it as 
“genocide resisters.” Although I do not discuss this category at length in this chapter, the 
majority of non‐Tutsi Rwandans fell into this category. Many of them assisted Tutsis and 
other people targeted for killing for as long as they were able. Furthermore, the majority of 
perpetrators fell into this category for days, weeks, or even months before they succumbed 
to the polyvalent pressures to participate. Even the most enthusiastic perpetrators some-
times helped Tutsi kin, friends, neighbors, classmates, or even strangers. In some cases, 
participating in the genocide increased a person’s ability to save other people. I reserve the 
term “rescuer” for those who protected or evacuated Tutsis, or made other efforts to save 
them and who did not participate in the genocide whether by killing, raping, destroying 
property, or looting. Rescuers were exceptional. They required not only the impulse to help 
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but also the persistence to make the decision both to rescue and not to participate 
repeatedly over time. I draw on interview data and ethnographic observation in eight 
communities conducted in Rwanda in 2011, 2013, and 2014 with my coinvestigator, 
Hager El‐Hadidi, as well as data collected in my earlier ethnographic research in Rwanda 
between 1997 and 2002.4
I first describe what Primo Levi called the moral “grey zone” of genocide. I assert that 
the grey zone forms the context for the morally complex decision‐making of ordinary 
citizens, including not only victims but also certain perpetrators, bystanders, and even 
rescuers. In this section, I also summarize what we already know about perpetrator behavior 
in the Rwanda genocide and elaborate a theoretical framework for understanding rescuers 
and rescuer behavior. Next, I describe the acts of rescue, opportunities, motivations, and 
decision‐making of rescuers in the Rwandan genocide. I conclude by describing the ways in 
which these stories of rescuers have been silenced in Rwanda and the implications of this 
silence for genocide survivors, their rescuers, and society as a whole.
The Moral Grey Zone
As Holocaust survivor and author Primo Levi (1989: 58) wrote about concentration 
camps in Nazi Europe, genocide produces a moral grey zone “of ambiguity which 
radiates out from regimes based on terror and obsequiousness” and where “the network 
of human relations … could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and persecutors” 
(Levi 1989: 37).5 Levi describes the ways in which concentration camp prisoners partici-
pated in their oppression and debasement through complicit acceptance of the situation, 
initiation into the social hierarchies that determined who lived (longer) and who died, or 
active collaboration as a camp leader or member of the squads who ran the gas chambers 
and crematoria. Levi elaborates:
terror, ideological seduction, servile imitation of the victor, myopic desire for any power 
whatsoever, even though ridiculously circumscribed in space and time, cowardice, and finally, 
lucid calculation aimed at eluding the imposed orders and order. All these motives, singly or 
combined, have come into play in the creation of this grey zone, whose components are bonded 
together by the wish to preserve and consolidate established privilege vis‐à‐vis those without 
privilege. (Levi 1989: 43)
In other words, camp prisoners found themselves faced with innumerable, impossible 
decisions in the pursuit of survival that, nevertheless, almost certainly ended in death. Levi 
concludes that the moral ambiguity of this space must be explored and recognized even if 
the prisoners do not bear the moral culpability of the SS soldiers running the camps or of the 
“very structure of the totalitarian state” that produced this evil system (Levi 1989: 42–43). 
In his deployment of the concept, Levi reserves the term “grey zone” mainly for concentration 
camp prisoners who collaborated with the Nazi guards and SS officers running the camp. 
Levi implies that the concept could be extended to Nazi guards who assisted prisoners by, 
for example, trading food for gold or valuables. He writes: “it is a grey zone, poorly defined, 
where the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge” (Levi 1989: 42). 
Crucial to the concept as Levi defines it is the moral ambiguity of decision‐making in the 
grey zone. While certain Nazi guards may be included, the camp commander would be 
excluded, as would SS soldiers who carried out their duties without reticence or who did not 
recognize prisoners as human beings deserving of respect, mercy, or assistance.
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Taking the moral grey zone of the concentration camp and applying it to the Rwandan 
genocide, where ordinary citizens were mobilized to participate, illuminates the ways in 
which individuals  –  whether as potential victims, rescuers, bystanders, or perpetra-
tors  –  faced complex and morally ambiguous decisions on a daily, sometimes even a 
minute‐by‐minute, basis. Within genocide studies, the categories of victim, perpetrator, 
bystanders, and rescuers have become fairly standardized. As Fujii points out, however, 
these categories “can obscure as much as they reveal” (2011: 145) because they reduce a 
person, with their often contradictory beliefs and actions, to an expected set of behaviors. 
Furthermore, it hides the reality that many people may pass from one of these categories 
to another over the course of a genocide or during mass atrocities. By shifting the focus 
away from these categories alone and concentrating instead on “acts of genocide” and 
“acts of rescue,” we can understand the ways in which complex decisions and behaviors 
emerge in the dynamic set of social, political, and economic processes that constitute 
a genocide.
From the perspective of categories, it may appear obvious that rescuers do not operate 
from a morally ambiguous position and thus should not be considered as part of the grey 
zone. If, instead, we focus on an individual’s many different actions over the course of a 
genocide, we begin to see that they are constantly faced with decisions made in morally 
ambiguous positions. We found several cases where rescuers denied assistance to someone 
in order to ensure the protection of others. In one case an orphanage director was protect-
ing hundreds of orphans, including hundreds whose parents had already been killed in the 
genocide (interview by author, Kigali, March 2014). Three priests from the parish church 
took refuge on the grounds of the orphanage but they had been seen entering by a neighbor, 
who informed the militias and the local police. The orphanage director explained to the 
priests that they were not safe at the orphanage and that they were endangering the children 
by remaining there. The director feared that the police would enter to search for the Tutsi 
priests and then allow the militias in to attack the children and orphanage staff. The priests 
left voluntarily but were then killed in another hiding place nearby. As he recounted the 
story, the orphanage director was clearly emotionally tormented by his moral complicity in 
the priests’ deaths, yet he was certain that allowing the priests to stay would have made it 
impossible for him to continue to protect the children and the orphanage staff. As I shall 
explain in more detail, the concept of the moral grey zone, combined with a focus on the 
acts – whether of genocide, resistance, or rescue – committed by individuals, can help us 
understand the complex interplay between internal and external factors shaping the 
decision‐making of ordinary citizens during mass violence.
A nearly universal explanation of motive given by participants in communal violence 
or genocide is that they were simply obeying orders (Hinton 2005: 276–277). Stanley 
Milgram’s (1974) obedience studies in the 1960s highlighted the willingness of average 
people to inflict pain on strangers by obeying the instructions of research study personnel. 
Similarly, Hannah Arendt (1963) argued that extremely evil acts could be perpetrated in a 
“banal” manner if situational constraints were strong enough. This obedience explanation 
“highlights a key dynamic involved in genocide. In some situations … perpetrators are 
heavily pressured … to obey orders” (Hinton 2005: 279). In this context, resistance or 
refusal to participate is an exception (Andrieu 2011: 495). Yet, explanations based on 
obedience are only partial as they ignore the “intense rage” or “hatred” that might accom-
pany it and cannot explain the “patterns of violence” that often emerge in genocide 
(Hinton 2005: 279). The leveling effects and political psychology of crowds play a role 
in shaping individuals’ behavior so that they behave in unexpected ways, engaging in 
scapegoating and jubilant destruction (Tambiah 1996: 266–296). Genocidal priming and 
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genocidal activation make genocide possible at the societal level, creating a context that 
shapes the decision‐making of individual perpetrators (Hinton 2005).
The individual decision‐making of mid‐ and low‐level perpetrators has been well researched 
in Rwanda. Straus (2006) and Fujii (2009) reject the predominant explanatory theory of 
genocide: people kill out of ethnic hatred. While high‐level perpetrators, what Rwandans call 
Interahamwe z’interahamwe (Interahamwe of the Interahamwe), went on a murderous 
rampage during the first five days, the genocide did not become a national policy until April 12 
(Guichaoua 2015: 242; Straus 2006: 50). Average citizens, who were mobilized during 
organized phases that occurred later, made calculated decisions about whether or not to 
participate. The ongoing civil war between the Rwandan government and the RPF provided 
the “essential rationale for mass killing: security” (Straus 2006: 8). Average civilians who 
participated found it morally tolerable to kill because they believed they were protecting 
their family’s, the community’s, or the nation’s security. Second, Rwandan state institutions 
penetrated deep into local communities, making it possible for centrally ordered com-
mands to be carried out in rural communities throughout the country (Straus 2006: 8). 
Finally, the established social category “Tutsi” identified the targets of violence once the 
massacres started. In the years leading up to the genocide, extremist propaganda promoted 
the idea that all Tutsis were allies of the rebel RPF. During the genocide, Rwandan national 
radio and extremists in control of the government continued to equate “Tutsi” with “enemy,” 
and declared that “the enemy must be eliminated” (Straus 2006: 9).
The lowest‐level participants, whom Fujii labels “joiners,” are the most puzzling subcategory 
of perpetrators because they “had the most to lose and the least to gain from participating,” 
and they were the most affected by the genocide’s destruction (2009: 16). Fujii concludes 
that local ties – defined as kinship, economic exchange, shared workplace, political affili-
ation, or education  –  and group dynamics mediated individual choices and actions at 
any given moment during the genocide. This approach makes it possible to explain why 
the same individual or family may have killed Tutsis at a roadblock at the same time as 
they hid and protected Tutsis in their home. The standard analytical categories of genocide 
(perpetrator, victim, bystander, and rescuer) are limited because an individual may simulta-
neously occupy two or more categories, or their categorization may change over time as 
they make decisions based on the situation in the moment (Fujii 2009: 8). Time is a final 
important factor in understanding perpetrator decision‐making and behavior (Fujii 2009; 
Hinton 2005). Individual perpetrators’ motivations do not remain constant over time. 
Even if a perpetrator first participates because of extreme structural constraints, he or she 
may later become desensitized to the “psychosocial dissonance” resulting from breaking 
moral prohibitions against harming other humans (Hinton 2005: 288). Or perpetrators 
may kill certain targets at roadblocks while sheltering other potential victims in their homes 
(Fujii 2009, 2011).
Two competing theories of rescuer behavior dominate research on the issue. One school 
of thought based primarily on analyses of rescuers during the Holocaust emphasizes 
intrinsic, individual features of moral behavior such as character, identity, and personality 
(see Monroe 1996, 2004; Oliner and Oliner 1988, 1995; Oliner et al. 1992). Based on her 
analysis of life history interviews with Yad Vashem‐certified “Righteous,” Monroe (2004: 
241) argues that “ethical political behavior flows naturally from our perceptions of self.” 
Her theory posits that “ethical acts emanate not so much from conscious choice but rather 
from deep‐seated instincts, predispositions, and habitual patterns of behavior that are 
related to our central identity” and that are “effectively preset for most adults” (Monroe 
2004: 241). The other school of thought based on comparative analysis of rescuers in 
World War II, the Armenian genocide, and Rwanda focuses on extrinsic features affecting 
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rescuer behavior such as geography, proximity to victims, presence of other minorities, 
details of genocidal policy, and opportunity (see the collection edited by Sémelin, Andrieu, 
and Gensburger 2008, 2011). From this perspective, rescuers “do not necessarily have a 
stable ‘personality’” (Andrieu 2011: 499), and constraints of time, space, and context, 
instead, play just as important a role as internal moral character. As I shall elaborate, this 
research demonstrates that a complex interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic factors struc-
tured the behavior and choices not only of rescuers but also of genocide resisters, bystanders, 
victims, and perpetrators.
In the Rwandan genocide, rescuers, just like perpetrators and victims, operated in a moral 
grey zone, making impossible choices innumerable times each day or night. The empirical 
data in Rwanda are clear: some perpetrators killed people while they simultaneously hid or 
protected others at home or smuggled them to safety (Fujii 2009, 2011). In some instances 
perpetrators participated in mass violence in groups, but as individuals they helped kin, 
neighbors, or even strangers escape the slaughter. In other cases, participating in the geno-
cide provided a sort of shield that enabled them to save people.
As a Muslim man, Ali,6 who had confessed to genocide crimes, explained:
Those who survived, in my mother’s family, sought refuge at our home. They were able to 
survive and they are still there. There is one who was at our home while another one was at 
my big brother’s place. We had shared them among us. We said that if there was a chance for 
us to survive, we would have at least one of the members saved, to keep the whole family from 
perishing. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)
Ali was 20 years old at the time of the genocide. Born to a Hutu father and Tutsi mother, 
he was harassed and faced intense pressure to participate in the killings because he was a 
young man and because his parentage made the Interahamwe and Hutu Power supporters 
suspicious of him. As Ali continued:
During that period of the Genocide, there were people who were called ibyimanyi [crossbreeds]. 
people who were born from a Hutu and a Tutsi. At that time [people like me were] harassed. 
When they went on their rounds [security patrols] through the neighborhoods, they would 
look for people who didn’t share their ideologies and they would say that those crossbreeds 
were not people one could trust completely. They used to wake me up at night and say that 
there was no way they would spend the night watching while a Tutsi slept. They used to tell me 
that I was indeed my mother’s son but they said I was not my father’s son. They used to say 
“look at how tall he is! Look at his nose.” And check all the characteristics they used to check 
and see me as … I don’t know. They viewed me as someone who didn’t share their ideologies. 
They would then make me get up and make rounds, saying that there was no way they were 
going to watch over me as I was sleeping. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)
Beyond the harassment he faced from the Interahamwe in the streets or in his own home, 
Ali’s father advised him to go on security patrols as a way to protect himself and the family. 
Ali clarified:
[my father] told me, “Get up and be with them, do not kill if they do. Just go with them and sit 
where they sit, to show them that you’re with them. If they keep on saying that you are an 
accomplice they will kill you as well.” So … I would go with them … Sometimes when they came 
to wake me up, [my father] would give me money they called “flashlight fees” to buy batteries for 
the flashlights they would use at night. That was money they bought alcohol with … he would 
give them like 5,000 francs to buy me a night off. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)
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At the time of the genocide, both Ali and his family understood his actions as a way to 
avoid participating in the genocide while giving the appearance of compliance to local 
officials and Interahamwe militias. In an interview in 2011, Ali had insisted that he had not 
participated in the genocide. Instead, he claimed that he had confessed as a way to reduce 
his sentence and leave prison. In 2013 he understood his actions in a new light. As he 
explained:
I was accused and put in prison … Then, I listened to what the Government came to teach us 
in prison about admitting crimes. I told them, “Given that I didn’t kill anyone, what shall I 
confess to?” But because I listened to what they taught us, I finally understood that genocide 
crimes are not about getting a machete and killing only. Genocide is a collective crime. Some 
people were accomplices. Others contributed to the planning and did the deed itself, but even 
the fact that you were standing all three together made the one who was killing confident 
because he knew that he was with you. That made the one you had gone to kill weaker and kept 
him from defending himself. What might he have done if there had been one killer? But because 
we were three, it made the killer strong. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)
The evolution in Ali’s thinking illustrates the influence of national narratives and state‐building 
practices to promote reconciliation. These efforts compel perpetrators and bystanders to 
accept their legal and moral complicity in the genocide. Furthermore, Ali’s story as a whole 
illuminates the terrible complexity of the moral grey zone. As elaborated on later, Ali’s 
geographic location in a neighborhood dominated by Hutu Power politicians and 
Interahamwe militias afforded him little opportunity to escape their coercive power.
acTs of rescue
In the midst of the mass death, some courageous people refused to participate in the 
genocide. Propaganda by Hutu extremists blaming Tutsis en masse for the ongoing civil 
war and the economic problems of the country had transformed social norms in the years 
leading up to the genocide. Once the genocide began, the Hutu Power movement quickly 
mobilized the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias to attack and kill Tutsis. Over the 
span of a few weeks, they attempted to engage the entire population in its genocidal project. 
They transformed everyday mechanisms for mobilizing the adult male population, like 
nightly security rounds and monthly communal labor (umuganda), into enforcement 
mechanisms for the genocide. Through these means, average civilian men who were reluc-
tant to join in the killing were initiated into the violence, first by participating in searches 
for people in hiding, then by participating in mob violence, and later by participating in 
killings. Sometimes coercion was used to get people to comply. In this context, the simple 
act of refusing to participate can be viewed as a courageous one.
Beyond refusing to participate, many people, including Hutus, Twa, and even Tutsis, 
engaged in rescuer behavior by assisting people who were being targeted. They hid Tutsis 
in their homes and stables or elsewhere on their property. After being summoned to public 
meetings, they warned people about search parties or imminent attacks. They negotiated 
the sparing of Tutsi lives using money, cigarettes, beer, or other goods. They hid or pro-
tected children whose parents had been killed or whose families asked them to protect 
them. They smuggled Tutsis across the border. They gave people in hiding food, water, 
clothing, or other assistance. They helped Tutsis flee. In some places where people sought 
protection, in churches, mosques, schools, or government buildings, they fought against 
attackers and died alongside Tutsis. At a mosque in a rural community in eastern Rwanda, 
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Muslims and Christians took refuge in the mosque (Viret 2011). When the Interahamwe 
militias came to attack them, they asked the Hutus to leave. They refused to do so and 
fought against the militiamen with their Tutsi neighbors (Viret 2011: 492). Most of them 
died. In Gisenyi, a town in northwestern Rwanda on the border with Zaire, Félicité 
Niyitegeka, a lay minister in the Catholic Church, gave Tutsis shelter at the Centre Pastorale 
de St. Pierre and helped them to flee across the border at unofficial crossings at night 
(interview by author, Gisenyi, February 2014). Niyitegeka’s brother, a colonel in the 
Rwandan army sent her a message asking her to stop her activities and leave so that she 
would not be killed. She refused and was taken with approximately 40 Tutsis to the infa-
mous “Commune Rouge” massacre site, where she was murdered along with the others 
(multiple interviews by author and by El‐Hadidi, Gisenyi, October 2013 and February 
2014). Many rescuers, like Niyitegeka, who hewed closely to their deeply held moral con-
victions died as martyrs. By refusing to bend their rectitude to the moral ambiguity required 
of the grey zone and to make decisions that may sacrifice some while saving others, they 
became genocide victims alongside those they sought to protect.
Numerous external factors constrained the opportunity to rescue others, as well as the 
likelihood that these actions would be successful. Perhaps the most important of these were 
opportunity and proximity (Sémelin, Andrieu, and Gensburger 2008, 2011). In Rwanda 
most people had the opportunity, even if only fleetingly, to provide assistance to someone 
targeted for killing. Hutus and Tutsis lived interspersed throughout Rwanda, especially in 
the cities, although some regions had higher percentages of Tutsis than others. In southern 
Rwanda, Tutsis constituted 14 percent to 21 percent of the population in Butare Prefecture 
(now part of Southern Province). Administrative officials and the majority of the population 
in Butare resisted participating in the genocide for weeks, even though in the neighboring 
prefecture of Gikongoro, which had a similar number of Tutsis, killings began immediately. 
In Butare, killings did not begin until the governor was removed from office and soldiers 
and Interahamwe were bused in from neighboring prefectures to initiate the violence. 
In Butare Prefecture, the majority of the population supported opposition political parties 
that were opposed to the Hutu Power coalition of extremists who prepared and organized 
the genocide. Furthermore, the region had a high rate of intermarriage between Hutus and 
Tutsis. These factors made much of the population harder to mobilize for the genocide 
project.
In northern and western Rwanda, where the Hutu Power movement was very strong, the 
population was more quickly mobilized. Killings in Gisenyi town started on the morning of 
April 7, as soon as Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militia members organized attack 
squads to search neighborhoods and set up roadblocks. In Gisenyi (now part of Western 
Province) and Byumba prefectures (now part of Northern Province) Tutsis constituted 1 
percent to 7 percent of the population and in Ruhengeri (now part of Northern Province) 
they were less than 1 percent of the population in 1994 (Guichaoua 2015: x). In these 
communities, people had few opportunities to rescue potential victims. Yet, the lack of 
Tutsis did not keep the population from participating in the killing. Men were mobilized to 
go and attack Tutsis in neighboring communities. In a rural community in the highlands, 
one perpetrator, Jean, explained how he went with a group of about 30 men to attack a 
homestead down near the shore of Lake Kivu:
The way Satan came that day: it’s as a young man from down there, where that person died. He 
told me that there was a cow somewhere, which he was going to sell me at a low price. I used 
to be a butcher at that time. When I heard that I was buying a cow at a low price, I went. When 
we got there, the cow was that side, they untied it. I left with the cow, the others stayed behind. 
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That person [who lived there, who owned the cow] stayed behind, too. Those who stayed behind 
attacked him and they killed him. (Interview by author, Kayove district, Western Province, 
October 2013)
In this community where fewer than a handful of Tutsis lived in 1994, local men were 
recruited to attack squads that went elsewhere to kill. Thus, geography played a structuring 
role in the violence as well as in rescue.
The border provided great opportunities for rescue, although they were also used to trap 
Tutsis evading the death squads. In Gisenyi segments of the border were open in 1994. 
Many properties on the border were used as smuggling routes and they became routes to 
evacuate people during the genocide. Many traders who engaged in smuggling as part of 
their business used the same means and methods to smuggle Tutsis across the border. Two 
indakemwe saved the lives of dozens of Tutsis in this way. An old woman in Gisenyi smug-
gled Tutsi children across the border in broad daylight. She took the children one by one 
across the border, telling the police and border guards that they were her grandchildren.7 
She crossed the border and left the children with relatives in Goma and then returned to 
Rwanda at a different border crossing. With these means, she saved the lives more than 
seven Tutsi children whose parents had been killed in her neighborhood. She took these 
actions despite her daughter’s objections.
In other communities, physical geography provided escape routes from massacre sites 
or banana plantations, forests, or marshes as places to hide. In communities along the 
shores of Lake Kivu, the local population used boats for fishing and trade across the 
lake. During the genocide, many used their boats to evacuate Tutsis across the lake to 
Zaire, to Gisenyi, where they could continue on to Congo, or to Kibuye, where many 
of them subsequently perished. In Mugandamure in southern Rwanda, its history as a 
Swahili camp during colonialism made it easy for residents to erect roadblocks to close 
the neighborhood off to outsiders.8 Residents then smuggled in Tutsis and hid them in 
their homes. On at least one occasion, a group of Interahamwe accompanied by soldiers 
forced their way into the neighborhood searching for specific people whom they knew 
were hiding in the neighborhood. These people were taken to a public square and 
killed. Nonetheless, the community succeeded in saving an unknown number of people 
in this way.
Local histories of communal violence between 1959 and 1973 and genocide priming in 
the early 1990s further shaped the unfolding of the genocide in communities across the 
country. In Nkora and Boneza in Western Province, many Tutsi genocide survivors 
recounted how Tutsis had been targeted during periods of ethnic violence in 1959, 1963–
1964, and 1973.9 During those episodes, mobs came down from the mountains to steal 
their cattle, destroy their property, and physically assault or even kill them. In the week after 
the RPF invasion in 1990, groups of men again attacked Tutsi homesteads in Boneza. The 
pattern continued in 1994 during the genocide with massacres in these communities being 
initiated by bands of Interahamwe coming down from the mountains. In Gisenyi town, 
genocide priming played a significant role. Within days of the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 
October 1990, there were instances of mob violence targeting Tutsis in Gisenyi. Gisenyi 
was also the stronghold of the Hutu Power movement within the dominant, state political 
party (MRND) and of a Hutu extremist party (CDR). Virtually all adult men in Gisenyi 
were members of either the MRND or the CDR. Male youth were under extreme pressure 
to join the Interahamwe. Killings of Tutsis began in Gisenyi as early as 10 a.m. on the morning 
of April 7, 1994. Killings also began in the capital city, Kigali, in the early hours of April 7, 
within hours of the president’s plane being shot down.
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In southern Rwanda, on the other hand, killings did not start until April 21 or 22, 1994. 
The governor of Butare, as well as the mayor of Nyanza, were opposed to the genocide and 
refused to implement it. On April 20, 1994, the interim president gave a speech in Butare 
and then replaced the governor. The genocide began the next day. In Nyanza, the killings 
started on April 22, after groups of soldiers were brought in on trucks the day before. On 
the first day, the Nyanza mayor was publicly lynched, which created an atmosphere of 
terror. Although the genocide was fierce and swift once it had begun, the RPF rebel group 
seized the region quickly, bringing the genocide to an end within a few weeks. In nearby 
Mugandamure, the RPF’s swift arrival allowed Muslim residents who had hidden and 
protected Tutsis to succeed in their acts of rescue.
Community structure and social networks significantly shaped individuals’ behavior 
during the genocide. Research by Fujii (2011) and McDoom (2014) has found that 
Rwandans who had more social connections with perpetrators were much more likely to 
become genocide perpetrators. In two communities where I conducted interviews in 
western and southern Rwanda, a history of communal activities among Muslims played a 
structural role in individual acts of rescue and in organized efforts among certain social net-
works to rescue Tutsis. During feast days in these communities, the local Muslim population 
included their non‐Muslim neighbors in their celebrations and shared meat with them. 
In addition, the local Muslim population organized the feasts, thus creating social relation-
ships and patterns of cooperation. These social relationships led to coordinated efforts 
among Muslims in these communities to hide and protect Tutsis in the south or to hide and 
evacuate Tutsis to Zaire in the west. In Gisenyi, on the other hand, Muslims were closely 
tied to the political elites who became the primary architects of the genocide. Virtually all 
Muslim men we interviewed in Gisenyi town said that they were members of the MRND 
political party in 1994, whereas Muslim men elsewhere in Rwanda indicated that they had 
not joined any party because Islam forbade it. Muslims in Gisenyi, particularly young men, 
faced enormous social pressure to join in the violence (as illustrated by Ali’s story).
People who tried to help or save Tutsis indicated that they had the opportunity to do so. 
Virtually all genocide survivors described people who could have helped them but refused. 
Thus, beyond simple opportunity, rescuers drew on an internal moral compass that guided 
their decisions. Most widely, genocide survivors and rescuers themselves described rescuers 
as people “who have a good heart” (bafite umutima mwiza), a Kinyarwanda phrase that 
encompasses a person’s mind, character, and spirit. As one Muslim woman who, at the age 
of 21, saved several Tutsi lives explained:
The reason why some people saved people while others didn’t … it went with the person’s 
heart; the one who had a beastly heart didn’t save the person but, the one who had a merciful 
heart which understood that a human being is a human being, saved that person. That’s how 
we saved people. (Interview by author, Nkora, October 2013)
A female genocide survivor who was 15 years old at the time of the genocide explained 
that having a good heart was not enough: “It requires courage for people to help others 
despite the risk. There is also a good heart, but it is courage” (interview by El‐Hadidi, 
Biryogo, November 2013). Another female genocide survivor who was only nine years 
old in 1994 explained that greed was one of the factors that separated perpetrators from 
rescuers:
People rescued victims from personal compassion. In general terms people who got involved in 
the violence were mostly motivated by material possessions they could get from the victims. 
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They perceived the victims’ death as an opportunity to get access to their things/property. 
On  the positive side, there were people who were not interested in the victims’ material 
possessions and preferred to rescue them because they were also convinced that the victims 
were innocent. (Interview by El‐Hadidi, Nkora, October 2013)
These internal moral orientations – having a good heart, being courageous, and eschewing 
material possessions – were cited frequently among interviewees who were asked about the 
motivations of rescuers. While any of these human impulses could be based in religious 
belief, Rwandans distinguished between these general moral orientations, based in an 
understanding of a common humanity, from explicit religious faith and practice.
Because the major religions in Rwanda, including Christianity and Islam, forbid murder; 
people assume that religion should have discouraged participation in the genocide. 
Nonetheless, people of all faiths, and even the clergy and religious leaders, were among the 
perpetrators. Christian “churches were a key factor in encouraging public involvement” in 
the 1994 genocide because they helped “make participating in the killing morally accept-
able” (Longman 2009: 306). The Roman Catholic Church had close ties to the state in 
Rwanda. Thus, when Catholic leaders failed to issue “a prompt, firm condemnation of the 
killing campaign” and, instead, expressed support for the new regime controlled by Hutu 
extremists, government officials and propagandists could “assert that the slaughter met 
with God’s favor” (Des Forges 1999: 246). In the absence of any other clear message from 
the church, many Christians concluded that participation in the genocide, or their “defense 
of the nation,” which was how they perceived their actions, was the will of God. The broad 
participation of Christians was not due to an insufficient conversion or adherence to 
doctrine; rather, the church’s historical integration with and support of the patrimonial 
networks of the Rwandan state implicated it in the state’s genocide project.
People of all faiths were also among the victims. Unlike many other instances of communal 
violence or genocide, such as the Holocaust in Europe or the civil wars in Northern Ireland, 
Sri Lanka, or Bosnia‐Herzegovina, religion did not serve as “an ascriptive identifier to single 
out” individuals to kill in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Longman 2009: 306). Christian 
churches became key massacre sites as ethnic Tutsis, and others targeted in the genocide, 
gathered in them to seek sanctuary from the killing. In previous instances of communal 
violence in 1959, 1962, 1963, and 1972, churches had served as places of refuge, and perpe-
trators of violence had not dared desecrate them. In 1994 the extremist Hutus who planned 
and carried out the genocide used this history as a strategy to concentrate their victims and 
make it easier to dispatch them en masse. They encouraged Tutsis to gather at these sites for 
their own protection and then brought in soldiers, militiamen, and the local population to kill 
them. Mosques rarely became massacre sites, because the imams closed them during the 
genocide and instructed Muslims to pray at home (interviews by author and El‐Hadidi, 
various locations, Rwanda, 2013).
Islam did not arrive in Rwanda until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
around the same time as European colonialism and Christian missionaries (Kagabo 1988: 17). 
European colonizers were generally hostile to Islam (Kagabo 1988: 18), but they allowed 
“Arabs” from East Africa (usually Muslim Africans or descendants of traders who had migrated 
to East Africa from the Middle East or India) to establish commercial outposts in the new 
colony (Ruanda‐Urundi). These economic centers became sites of Islamic conversion thanks 
to economic ties forged between Arab, Indian, and Swahili traders and the local population 
(Kagabo 1988: 60–84). Yet, Muslims in Rwanda, whether they were foreigners, immigrants 
and their descendants, or local converts, lived largely apart from the rest of the Rwandan 
population in Muslim neighborhoods in commercial centers around the country.
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Because of their distinct language (Swahili), style of dress, foods, and habits, Rwandan 
Muslims were perceived as foreigners in their own country (Kagabo 1988). The anti‐Islamic 
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and Catholic schools in Rwanda caused Rwandan 
Muslims to be poorly perceived by their compatriots (Kagabo 1988: 45). Non‐Muslim 
Rwandans traded with Muslims but otherwise avoided them. Despite this marginalization, 
Muslims were perceived as wealthy because of their control of trade goods and more 
European lifestyle. In eastern and southern Rwanda, some Tutsi nobles married their 
daughters to Muslim men. This pattern of Tutsi in‐marriage continued into the postcolo-
nial period. As a result, many Rwandan Muslims had Tutsi mothers. Negative perceptions 
of Rwandan Muslims continued in the postcolonial period. Few Muslims achieved a formal 
education beyond primary school unless they found the means to continue their studies 
abroad (Kagabo 1988: 218; Kasule 1982: 41, 138–141).
Religion featured prominently in some explanations of rescuer behavior and the distinc-
tions between people who joined the genocide and those who refused to participate. Both 
Muslim and Christian rescuers depicted a fear of God as part of their motivation for trying 
to help Tutsis, or characterized their actions as purely being an instrument of God’s will. As 
one Muslim rescuer explained:
Our religion, Islam, doesn’t allow people to spill our neighbors’ blood. We looked and we only 
saw brothers here. You could not think about killing this person, because he was a brother, 
someone who would have rescued you too, if you needed help. (Interview by author, 
Mugandamure, July 2013)
Another Muslim elder who saved many Tutsis during the genocide explained, “I’m so poor 
in this life, how is it possible to lose both heaven and earth in this lifetime?” Another 
Muslim rescuer clarified, “It was not me; it was Allah who protected them” (interview by 
El‐Hadidi, Gisenyi, October 2013). In response to being asked why he saved people, a 
Catholic man said, “God and my Christian belief” (interview by El‐Hadidi, Gisenyi, 
November 2013). A Pentecostal man who was a soldier in the Rwandan army explained:
I was a soldier inside Rwanda. I was a Christian from ADEPR. Following my beliefs and how I 
saw other religions, the true believer didn’t participate in the Genocide. I mean the true faith 
is not about religion. Whether it is a Muslim, a Catholic, an Adventist, and my fellow Pentecost, 
those who were true believers never got involved. I am among those who rescued people, and 
among those who did not participate. (Interview by El‐Hadidi, Nyanza, August 2013)
The moral grey zone created in the chaos of genocide, along with the moment‐by‐moment 
decision‐making necessitated by the complex and constantly evolving situation, resulted in 
rescuer behavior being quite common but rescuers being exceptional. Being a rescuer or 
perpetrator is not a binary or static identity. Rather, rescuer behavior was formed by a com-
plex interconnection between extrinsic and intrinsic factors that impacted an individual’s 
choices, decisions, and opportunities to resist genocide. To be a rescuer, a person needed the 
personal conviction or moral compass that impelled them to behave morally, but they also 
needed the opportunity and the skills and resources to make their actions successful. Most 
importantly, they required the patience, persistence, and fortitude to make the right decisions 
many times each day over several weeks or even months. To become a participant in the 
genocide only took one momentary decision, for example, putting one’s family’s or their 
own safety ahead of those whom they were protecting. In short, becoming a rescuer meant 
making the decision to rescue over and over again and not only once.
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silence
In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, many survivors felt compelled to recognize the 
courageous individuals who had helped save their lives. Yet, they found that the political 
context made it too risky. As a national representative of the genocide survivors’ association, 
Ibuka, explained: “There have been moments when it has been impossible to talk about 
rescuers during the genocide. Immediately after, many of us tried to [publicly] recognize 
the people who saved us, but we discovered it wasn’t wise. The government didn’t want to 
hear about it” (author’s interview with Ibuka national representative, Kigali, October 
2013). In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the new government led by the former 
rebel movement and army, the RPF, was focused on locating and imprisoning genocide 
perpetrators. The majority of these suspects were Hutu, especially young Hutu men. As a 
result, the government was not interested in publicly recognizing Hutus who had rescued 
Tutsis. Furthermore, the phenomenon of the “killer‐rescuers,” those who had killed some 
while rescuing others, was coming to light (Fujii 2011). Thus, rescuers themselves were 
reluctant to be known publicly for fear of becoming suspected of genocide crimes.
When I conducted research in Rwanda in the late 1990s, few people talked openly about 
the 1994 genocide (Burnet 2012: 79). While the reasons for their silence were numerous, 
principal among them was fear of attracting attention that could lead to accusations of 
genocide crimes. Rescuers, in particular, remained silent. A Hutu man explained:
I tried to save someone. He stayed here in my house for four weeks. He climbed over the rear 
wall [pointing to the compound wall behind the house]. We didn’t know him … I kept him 
here … Then, we decided to flee. We could not bring him with us. I don’t know what happened 
to him … I do not say these things because people can misunderstand or twist my words to say 
that I am the one who had him killed. (Interview by author, Kigali, 2011)
Despite its official policy of national unity, Rwandan government practices of national 
memory and genocide commemoration in the late 1990s and early 2000s politicized victim-
hood and globalized blame on Hutus (Burnet 2009: 80). During this period, the government 
exercised tight control over public representations of the genocide. The annual genocide 
commemoration ceremonies often included public recognition of people who had risked 
their lives to save Tutsis in the genocide. In most instances, a genocide survivor would give 
testimony and present the person who had helped them. The rescuer would then say a few 
words about why they had done what they did. National Heroes Day recognized stories of 
rescue among other types of national heroes. For example, Félicité Niyitegeka, who saved 
scores of Tutsis in Gisenyi and died with others whom she refused to abandon, is among 
the national heroes. Such stories of rescue, performed as part of government‐sponsored 
commemoration activities, contained these narratives in official, public discourse and ensured 
that they did not create public heroes who could become potential political rivals of the RPF 
party or its candidates.
Stories of rescuers promoted outside of official Rwandan government channels often 
faced public opposition. Internationally perhaps the best‐known rescuer is Paul Rusesabagina, 
the hotel manager who saved people at the Hôtel des Mille Collines, as portrayed in the 
film Hotel Rwanda. His story was first recounted by the journalist Philip Gourevitch in his 
1998 book, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families. This 
story caught the attention of writer and director Terry George, who then researched 
Rusesabagina’s story and wrote and directed the film, which was released in 2004. In 2005 
Rwandan journalists began a smear campaign against Rusesabagina.10 The campaign begun 
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by journalists was then taken up by politicians, culminating in President Kagame condemn-
ing Rusesabagina by name during the twelfth national genocide commemoration ceremony 
on April 6, 2006 (George 2006). The campaign against Rusesabagina has continued in the 
Rwandan and international media.11 Rusesabagina is but one example of a rescuer who 
gained public attention outside of Rwandan government channels and then found himself 
or herself the target of a smear campaign or other forms of coercion. These examples 
encouraged rescuers in Rwanda, as well as genocide survivors who wanted to recognize 
them publicly, to remain largely silent.
Once the Gacaca courts completed their work in the late 2000s, public discourse opened 
slightly on the question of rescuers. In 2009 the national genocide survivors’ association 
Ibuka launched a pilot research project to identify people it called indakemwa, meaning 
“those who are morally beyond reproach.” The definition of indakemwa was largely based 
on the state of Israel and Yad Vashem’s designation of “Righteous Among the Nations,” to 
recognize non‐Jews who risked their lives, freedom, or safety to save one or more Jews 
during the Holocaust without any financial compensation or other reward (Tevosyan 
2008: 186). Ibuka defined indakemwa as people (1) who had saved one or more Tutsis 
during this genocide; (2) who had not received any compensation for their actions; (3) who 
had not participated in the genocide by killing, physically assaulting, tracking or hunting, 
denouncing or revealing Tutsis in hiding, or by stealing or destroying property; and (4) who 
testified about the genocide and did not spread genocide ideology (Kayishema and Masabo 
2010: 22–24). This last requirement extends infinitely into the future, meaning that a 
person who qualifies as indakemwa can lose their status if they say or do something perceived 
as spreading genocide ideology. In this pilot study, Ibuka identified 372 people around the 
country whom it designated as “presumed indakemwa” (Kayishema and Masabo 2010: 25). 
The organization has not yet found funding to continue its research or to create a permanent 
process for identifying and verifying indakemwa (interviews by author, Rwanda, 2014–2016). 
These ongoing efforts to recognize rescuers in a formal and public way have the potential 
to provide models of behavior and decision‐making that oppose genocide in both ideology 
and action. Accounting for the good amid the overwhelming evil of genocide provides 
some survivors with hope and a renewed faith in humans.
Rescuers, especially those who survived the genocide, were exceptional. Like many 
others, they had the compulsion to save others. Rescuers had “good hearts,” were “coura-
geous,” and did not succumb to greed, but these internal moral orientations were not 
enough. What set rescuers apart from those who resisted for days or weeks and then partic-
ipated in the genocide was that rescuers persisted in this conviction over long periods of 
time and succeeded in their efforts to rescue Tutsis. Thus, the internal features of moral 
behavior – character, identity, personality, religious belief, or self‐perception – do not on 
their own distinguish rescuers from genocide resisters, bystanders, or perpetrators. Nor can 
the external features that affect rescuer behavior  –  geography, timelines, proximity, or 
opportunity – account for these distinctions. Being a rescuer or a perpetrator was not a 
static, unchanging identity. The complex interplay between personal conviction, moral 
compulsion, and religious orientation, along with external factors, makes it possible for 
some people to choose to rescue, to refuse to participate in genocide, to persist in these 
choices and to make them repeatedly, and to succeed in making their conviction reality. 
They demonstrated enormous courage and great ingenuity by providing water, food, 
clothing, or shelter; by warning people of search parties or attacks; by negotiating for  people’s 
lives in exchange for money, cigarettes, beer, or livestock; by hiding or protecting children 
whose parents had been killed; and by smuggling people to safety. In these acts, rescuers 
faced the grey zone of genocide where they were forced to make morally ambiguous 
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decisions. Sometimes, in order to succeed in their attempts to rescue, rescuers had to 
abandon someone they had helped, to turn people over to soldiers or police who carry a 
warrant even though they are likely to be killed, or to ask someone to leave.
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1 Estimates of how many people died in the 1994 genocide range from 500,000 (Des Forges 1999: 15) 
to 1 million (MINALOC 2004: 21). For more on the numbers of dead and their politicization, 
see Scott Straus (2006: 51).
2 “Achievements of the ICTR,” http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/achievements.htm 
(accessed September 15, 2007).
3 I use “Gacaca” to refer to the Gacaca courts instituted to adjudicate genocide cases and gacaca 
to refer to the informal, traditional conflict resolution mechanism.
4 This research was supported by the University of Louisville Research Foundation and 
Department of Anthropology and the National Science Foundation under Grant Nos. 1230062 
and 1550655. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science 
Foundation.
5 I owe thanks to the editor Antonius Robben for his detailed and thought‐provoking commen-
tary on an earlier draft of this chapter. In this section on the moral grey zone, in particular, 
his comments helped me reconsider and refine my analysis both of Levi’s concept and of my 
application of it to the Rwandan case.
6 All interviewee names are pseudonyms. Human subjects protocols granted all participants 
anonymity.
7 Interview by author, Gisenyi, 2013.
8 Interviews by author and El‐Hadidi, Mugandamure, 2013.
9 Interviews by author and El‐Hadidi, Nkora and Boneza, 2013.
10 The film’s director, Terry George, defended the version of events recounted in the film and 
explained the timeline of the smear campaign against Rusesabagina in a Washington Post opinion 
editorial in May 2006 (George 2006).
11 See, e.g., Melvern 2011.
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